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Other People’s Money 
Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson∗ 
 
“I was in one board meeting, and I said, ‘I started this [com-
pany] to do positive things with the world and do good in the 
Amazon, not necessarily to get a big payout.’ . . . And one of 
[the Angel investors] looks me in the eye and said, ‘Well, the 
problem is, that you went out and took $9 million of other 
people's money.’”1 
 
Legal principles that are almost right are often more mischie-
vous than those that are completely wrong. What is transparently 
wrong is interpreted narrowly (or ignored altogether) and is 
likely to be repealed. An almost-right principle invites sloppy 
thinking, vague generalities, and a general distortion of the oth-
erwise sound ideas that lie close by. An example of an almost-
right principle that has distorted much of the thinking about cor-
porate law in recent decades is the oft-repeated maxim that direc-
tors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 
This principle (embraced by the Supreme Court in the Nine-
teenth Century2 and as recently as last May by the Delaware Su-
preme Court3) is not on its face silly. A board of directors, as 
Adam Smith observed long ago, is charged with taking care of 
 
∗ University of Chicago Law School. We are grateful to Donald Bernstein, 
William Birdthistle, Robert Rasmussen, and Daniel Sullivan for their help and 
to the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation for research 
support. 
1 Gwendolyn Bounds, The Perils of Being First with the Next Big Thing, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2007.  
2 See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720 (1862) (directors 
“hold a place of trust and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with 
fidelity, not for their own benefit, but for the common benefit of the stock-
holders of the corporation”). 
3 See North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v. 
Gheewalla, 2007 WL 1453705 (Del. May 18, 2007) (noting “[i]t is well estab-
lished that the directors owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”). 
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other people’s money,4 and it is usual in such cases for the law to 
impose special and unremitting duties. After all, directors lack the 
“anxious vigilance” that we use when looking after our own 
money.5 Hence, directors should have a general legal duty to care 
for this money as a reasonable person would care for it if acting 
on her own account.6 
The money in question usually is thought to belong to the 
shareholders. They contribute capital in the first place, they typi-
cally elect the board, and their blessing is required for major 
transactions. They stand to gain a dollar if the directors make the 
right decision and lose a dollar if they make the wrong one. In 
short, “the corporate contract makes managers the agents of the 
equity investors.”7 As the residual claimants, and unlike most 
creditors,8 “[t]hey receive few explicit promises. Instead they get 
the right to vote and the protection of fiduciary principles.”9 
 
4 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (1776) (Cannan edition). We 
are not the first to borrow this from Smith. It was the title of a series of essays 
by Louis Brandeis published in 1914. See LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S 
MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT (1914) (criticizing bankers who sat on boards 
and controlled firms to do the bidding of the bank, despite the fact that the 
bankers were investing other people’s money). It is also the title of a 2004 
screed against investment bankers and President George W. Bush by a for-
mer managing director of Goldman Sachs. See NOMI PRINS, OTHER PEOPLE’S 
MONEY: THE CORPORATE MUGGING OF AMERICA (2004). Other People’s Money 
was also the title of a 1991 film by Norman Jewison starring Danny DeVito 
and Gregory Peck (based on a play by Jerry Sterne). OPM was the name of a 
corporation whose owners possessed a more acute awareness of acronyms and 
irony than its customers. It perpetrated one of the major frauds of the 1980s.  
5 SMITH, supra note 4, at 700.  
6 The obvious analogy, and one we make below, is to the law of trusts. See 
supra notes 75-76 and surrounding text. 
7 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel link the fiduciary 
obligations of the directors to the residual claimants, not to equity holders per 
se. As we explore below, this is not quite right either.  
8 So-called “contract” creditors, or ones who voluntarily enter into loan or 
bond or other debt agreements with the firm usually set out many obligations 
in the investment contract. Involuntary creditors, such as tort victims, do not, 
of course, enjoy such protections. 
9 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 91. 
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But this is not the whole story. The common stockholder is 
merely one flavor of investor. Others, such as lenders, bondhold-
ers, and preferred stockholders, also stand to gain or lose with 
right or wrong decisions.10 Moreover, with the right package of 
derivatives, a debtholder can enjoy the same cashflow rights as an 
equityholder and vice versa.11 Shareholders ordinarily control the 
board, but any number of devices (from loan covenants to voting 
trusts) can give this power to other investors, including creditors 
and preferred stockholders.12 As financial innovation has acceler-
ated over the past two decades, the terms “shareholder” and 
“debtholder” or “creditor” have become less meaningful.13 Iden-
 
10 In this paper, we focus narrowly on investors, not on the many others 
(from workers to surrounding communities) whom the corporation affects. Our 
focus here—on the way that thinking of fiduciary duties running to, or only 
to, shareholders is an almost-right but pernicious idea—stands apart from 
whether the law should oblige the board to take other, non-financial 
stakeholders into account. The corporate social responsibility debate is about 
taking power away from investors and giving it to stakeholders, whereas our 
project is about identifying exactly who the investors are. 
11 Consider two simple examples. A stockholder (who is in a long position) 
can buy a put option to create a floor for any losses, and sell a call that would 
create a ceiling on any gains. Debtholders can buy call options or get conver-
sion rights that give them the potential to capture upside beyond the plain 
terms of their debt contract. There are an infinite number of permutations that 
allow both equity and debt holders to create such synthetic positions. This 
process has been going on for a long time. See Merton H. Miller, Financial In-
novation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 459, 460-63 (1986). For a discussion in the context of tax law, see 
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary, Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax 
Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460, 461 (1993) (“Continuous disaggregation, recom-
bination, and risk reallocation have produced a changing array of new finan-
cial contracts that pose a serious challenge for the income tax.”)  
12 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Miss-
ing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006). 
13 With credit derivatives, debt, which was once held in large blocks and 
subject to large, heavily negotiated, and covenant-laden contracts, is now sold 
off into tiny slices to thousands of investors and is subject to many fewer con-
tractual protections. In other words, it looks like much more like equity. Eq-
uity, which is increasingly finding its way into large private equity funds, 
takes on some debt-like characteristics, since it is not tradeable (at least for 
many years) and is often held in large blocks and in convertible forms. We 
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tifying only shareholders as investors, as opposed to all providers 
of capital is misleading. The problems likely to arise are already 
evident,14 and the current surge in financial innovation will likely 
exacerbate them.15 
The notion that fiduciary duties are owed shareholders has not 
yet generated seriously wrong-headed outcomes. (Among other 
things, the Delaware chancellors are generally too smart to let this 
happen.) Nevertheless, the reasoning needed to navigate around 
the sacred cow that the duty of the directors is owed solely to the 
shareholders has become increasingly awkward. People who 
should know better paint themselves into embarrassing corners 
trying to reaffirm the principle.16 
 
could go on and on, in fact, one of us does in other work. See [Henderson 
(2007)]. For now it is sufficient to state that the lines are increasingly blurry. 
14 Modern financial engineering enables investors to parse capital struc-
tures—cash flow rights, voting, and so on—in ways that make any attempt to 
pigeonhole investments as one type or another nearly meaningless. One 
prominent example of the confusion created by crude labels is the conduct 
surrounding the proposed merger of Mylan and King, two pharmaceutical 
companies. The market believed that this was a bad deal for Mylan (the 
buyer) but a good one for King (the target). An investor in King wanted the 
deal to go through, so it engaged in a series of transactions whereby it could 
in effect buy votes in Mylan, which it would then vote in favor of the deal, 
without exposing itself to the economic risk of the transaction—what is known 
as “vote buying”. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the 
Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. 
Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1750 (2007) (describing vote buying in 
the Mylan-King deal as “abuse” and doubting the SEC’s authority to regulate 
the practice absent a new congressional statute). 
15 See, e.g, Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of 
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007) (describing the new financial 
products that allow holders of credit to share risk). 
16 See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Cor-
porate Duty to Creditors, 108 COLUM. L. REV. --- (2008). Hu and Westbrook ar-
gue that directors should owe their duties exclusively to equityholders until 
the corporation is in bankruptcy. Once having done this, however, they must 
explain how the directors could ever file a bankruptcy petition (something 
they think directors should be able to do). They equivocate about how the 
shareholders might themselves benefit from a bankruptcy petition (something 
that is rarely true), confess that the problem is hard, and then admit that 
 
 Other People’s Money  /  5 
 
The problem is not as simple as whether directors should act in 
the interests of shareholders. Courts are being forced to answer 
not only offensive fiduciary duty claims by shareholders but also 
ones by creditors—e.g., creditors arguing that they are owed fi-
duciary duties in some cases—as well as defensive ones—e.g., 
shareholders or creditors arguing that director actions favoring 
one are a breach of duties owed to the other. Creditors also 
sometimes argue for the disablement of duties owed sharehold-
ers, so that they may enforce their contractual rights without a 
fiduciary trump by shareholders. Directors, who must make diffi-
cult decisions and who are often forgotten in these cases, must 
also have clear rules about how they should act—the cases, even 
if coming to the right result in most instances, leave this question 
largely unanswered. 
If we are right that fiduciary duties are becoming more harm-
ful than helpful, the question becomes what principle ought to re-
place the idea that fiduciary duties are owed shareholders. The 
most obvious one follows naturally from the idea that ex ante in-
vestors presumptively are interested in maximizing the value of 
the firm as a whole. Following the lead of Circuit Judge Easter-
brook in Central Ice Cream,17 we might instead adopt the following 
principle: The directors must adopt the course that, in their judg-
ment, maximizes the value of the firm as a whole. This principle 
of value maximization could also be coupled with a strong busi-
ness judgment rule. Courts lack information and expertise that 
would allow them to effectively and efficiently police director de-
cisions, and cannot easily determine under any set of facts 
whether a particular decision was, when made, designed to 
maximize firm value. Hence, the directors must enjoy a large 
measure of discretion, and claims by one class of investor against 
another alleging breach of a fiduciary duty would fail so long as 
the directors acted reasonably to enhance firm value.  
Under this view, there is little we can say about the duties of di-
rectors other than that directors should rarely, if ever, be liable 
 
“[m]uch theoretical and empirical analysis (including many research grants) 
will be essential in the years ahead.” Id. at 68.  
17 In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 
66-68 and surrounding text. 
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for a decision that, notwithstanding its effect on one type of inves-
tor, maximizes the value of the corporation (unless their action 
violates some specific covenant or by-law), and directors invite 
trouble (but do not necessarily expose themselves to liability) if 
they make a decision that reduces the value of the corporation. 
This view has yet to be clearly articulated, but it is immanent in 
much recent work and is in line with the traditional law and eco-
nomics approach to corporate law.18 
In this paper, however, we suggest that this approach too may 
be wanting. There may be good reasons why sophisticated inves-
tors negotiating for combinations of cash-flow and control rights 
would choose models that depart from the simple one that re-
quires directors to always maximize firm value. In some instances 
the efficient ex ante bargain may include terms that look ineffi-
cient ex post.19 For example, creditors may need to be able to 
have the ability to engage in self-serving behavior that compro-
mises the value of the business as a whole in order to ensure that 
the shareholders have the right set of incentives in the previous 
period. In other words, the real option for one investor to take 
disproportionate value from the firm under certain circumstances 
gives other investors/managers incentives to avoid these circum-
stances. Imposing a value-maximizing duty, even with a strong 
business judgment rule, may be contrary to what the investors 
want in their ex ante bargain. Decisions that destroy value ex post 
(from the whole-firm perspective) are suspect, but may be what 
the parties bargained for. 
At first cut, we should respect the choices investors and direc-
tors make, even if they seem to create situations where the board 
acts in ways that appear to destroy firm value.20 Corporate fi-
nance and corporate governance are not one-size-fits-all, and firm 
 
18 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1990) 
(arguing that fiduciary duties are simply part of the private ordering of con-
trol rights). 
19 One possibility is the incentive-to-do-well argument we float above. See 
supra notes 92-93 and surrounding text. 
20 This is especially true when there is little reason to doubt that the con-
tracts were entered into voluntarily, by parties with knowledge about the 
terms of the contract, and with more or less equal bargaining power. 
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capital structures are heterogeneous, complex, negotiated, and, 
most importantly, priced by the market.  
From this perspective, courts should tread lightly, even when 
faced with self-serving behavior, lest they upset what they don’t 
understand.21 Our understanding of capital structures is simply 
too primitive for us to do much more than enforce the contracts 
that are written as best we can. The default rules we devise—and 
fiduciary obligations are simply one of these22—should be in serv-
ice of these contracts. Imposing duties on directors that are too 
rigid or too mechanical may limit the ability of investors to create 
capital structures that are beyond the ken of those writing the 
rules.23  
 
21 An important distinction here must be made between director conduct 
that is purely self-serving and conduct that is doing the bidding of those who 
installed them and that may incidentally benefit the director personally. 
Imagine two cases: in the first, a director elected by shareholders votes to ap-
prove a transaction in which the firm buys a piece of land from him at a sig-
nificant premium to its market value; in the second, a director appointed pur-
suant to a contract with a senior creditor, votes to approve a transaction that 
benefits the creditor (and himself) at the expense of the common shareholders. 
As we discuss below, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the second case 
is a part of the efficient ex ante bargain among investors, and courts should be 
cautious before disrupting these transactions. The first is obviously a classic 
self-dealing transaction that any court would disrupt absent ratification by dis-
interested board or shareholder vote. Of course, there is a danger that courts 
will not be able to readily distinguish these two cases (and that the directors in 
case 1 will dress it up to look like case 2), but these concerns are overblown. 
The world we imagine—where there are no fiduciary duties—is one that 
would still permit courts to police obvious self dealing, while preserving the 
ability of investors to bargain for efficient control rights. Red flags will be 
raised not only in cases where directors profit personally in ways that are 
unique to them, but also in cases in which litigants claim that directors should 
have voted in ways that are different from the interests of those who installed 
them on the board. 
22 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary 
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary duties are necessary 
gap filling by courts for incomplete contracts written by shareholders and 
firms). 
23 There is a robust literature on the so-called “common agency” problem—
that is, where multiple principals (investors) are designing an incentive struc-
ture for a single agent (managers). See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael 
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This is especially true since investors cannot easily opt out of a 
fiduciary duty once it is put in place.24 Hence, it may make sense 
to eliminate the concept of fiduciary duty from corporate law al-
together. Rather than any generalized duty to shareholders or to 
the firm or to sometimes shareholders and sometimes creditors, 
directors should merely be obliged to honor the terms of the 
firm’s investment contracts, even when they lead to decisions that 
are not value maximizing ex post for the investors as a group. Di-
rectors would merely have the duty to attend to the affairs of the 
corporation and act in good faith, a duty owed to investors and 
strangers alike. In this world, shareholders, like creditors, must 
protect themselves through their powers under the corporate 
charter and the by-laws. 
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I shows how the maxim 
that fiduciary duties are owed shareholders cannot be reconciled 
even with current doctrine. Part II goes on to show how the effort 
to sort out with greater particularity what duties are owed to 
whom is doomed to fail. Here we use the recent mess in Dela-
ware over fiduciary duties in the “zone of insolvency” as our 
 
D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 Econometrica 923 (1986); Joel S. Demski & 
David Sappington, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents, 33 J. 
Econ. Theory 152 (1984); Bengt Holmström & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Princi-
pal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 
J. L. Econ. & Org. 24 (1991). The models in this work are largely unhelpful 
here, since they deal with coordination issues, private information, and incen-
tive schemes designed in environments that look very little like the ex ante 
corporate bargain. See, e.g., Fahad Khalil et al., Monitoring a Common Agent: 
Implications for Financial Contracting, __ J. ECON. THEORY __ (2007) (modeling 
the monitoring incentives of principals in the face of privately informed 
agents and financial contracts designed in isolation of each other). 
24 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obliga-
tion, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (“[F]iduciary obligation sometimes operates pre-
cisely in opposition to intention as manifest in express agreements.”); see also 
id. at 923 (“A provision in a trust instrument cannot relieve a trustee of liabil-
ity for any profit derived from a breach of trust . . ..”). The Uniformed Trust 
Code limits the ability of the parties to modify fiduciary duties. Section 
105(b)(2) and (3) provide that the parties may not waive “the duty of the trus-
tee to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the trust” nor 
“the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of the beneficiar-
ies.” UNIF. TRUST. CODE §105 (2005). 
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principal exhibit. This part goes on to examine the paradigm that 
sits most comfortably with current thinking about corporate law 
in the courts and in the academy—the idea of fiduciary duties be-
ing owed to the firm as a whole, coupled with a strong business 
judgment rule. Part III shows how this principle itself may be 
wanting and sets out an alternative paradigm, one in which no 
fiduciary duties exist at all, and directors face liability for their de-
cisions (other than for neglect or surreptitious self-dealing) only if 
they violate a contractual obligation owed a shareholder, creditor, 
or other investor.  
Part IV briefly shows how separating corporate law from con-
ceptions of duty brings needed clarity to the often-litigated issue 
of disclosure duties.25 The problem, we suggest, is largely contrac-
tual, and in setting the default rules the focus should be on the 
ability of parties to opt out—or opt in.  
I.  
Directors routinely make decisions that unambiguously favor 
creditors and other investors at the expense of the holders of 
common stock. The most obvious example is the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition, the immediate effect of which is to destroy the 
option value of the equity of the business for the benefit of credi-
tors. No one claims that doing this violates directors’ duties, and 
courts generally do not intervene in decisions about whether to 
file or not file a bankruptcy petition.26 This is only the most obvi-
 
25 As we show, modern securities law and doctrines such as insider trading 
are premised entirely on state-law fiduciary duties. See, e.g., United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (noting that “§ 10(b) liability ‘is premised upon 
a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction,’”). 
26 In Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 735 A.2d 386 
(Del. Ch. 1999), a shareholder sued for breach of fiduciary duty on the ground 
that the firm did not file a Chapter 11 petition, and instead allowed another 
shareholder, who was the firm’s largest creditor, to foreclose on firm assets. 
The court rejected this claim, noting that the board balanced the effects of 
various courses of action on shareholders and “creditors and other corporate 
constituencies” and the decision was to be respected so long as it was not “dis-
loyal to [the firm], taken as a whole.” Id. at 420. See also Blackmore Partners, 
L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, 2005 WL 2709639 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005) (holding 
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ous example of what boards can do at the expense of sharehold-
ers and to the benefit of other investors. When the examples are 
tallied together, the conventional account of fiduciary duties being 
owed shareholders cannot be reconciled with existing law, even 
when coupled with an extremely deferential business judgment 
rule. 
A. 
A board of directors can combine two businesses in a manner 
that denies shareholders of one the ability to vote on the transac-
tion.27 For example, in Delaware, shareholders of both the 
“buyer” and “seller” are entitled to vote on all statutory merg-
ers.28 The board of a buyer, however, can take the vote away 
from its own shareholders by structuring the merger as a triangu-
lar merger: the board creates a subsidiary firm of the buyer, of 
which the buyer firm is the only shareholder, and then executes a 
merger between the seller firm and the subsidiary.29 The subsidi-
ary holds a vote on the merger, and the buyer firm votes its one 
share in the subsidiary (as per a majority vote of the buyer’s 
board) in favor of the merger. There is no judicial check, say 
through a “business purpose” test, on the rationale for structur-
ing a merger in the form of a triangle, nor any need to show that 
the structure maximizes firm value.30 
 
that the board could take actions that benefited creditors at the expense of 
shareholders—that is, getting nothing for shareholders in an asset sale after 
rejecting a plan that would have returned something to equity holders). 
27 See D.G.C.L. §251 (c) (providing that a merger is valid only if approved 
by a majority of shareholders of both buyer and seller). 
28 See id. (providing that a vote must be taken by “each constituent corpora-
tion” to the agreement.). 
29 Various permutations of this basic idea allow selling firm shareholders to 
accomplish a similar result. 
30 See, e.g., Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 69, (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
claims that a triangular merger was an improper redemption of stock under 
Delaware law); Hariton v. ARCO Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 
1963) (rejecting business purpose test and de facto merger doctrine). 
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The board may do the same thing with shareholders’ appraisal 
rights.31 The right to receive a judicial appraisal of shares in a 
merger, like the right to vote, is enshrined in state corporate law 
statutes. The origin of the appraisal remedy can be traced back to 
the change in voting rule for certain fundamental transactions 
from unanimity to majority rule—the appraisal right was the quid 
for the quo of allowing transactions to proceed against the will of 
certain shareholders.32 It was viewed as an essential stick in a 
shareholder’s bundle of rights. And yet, boards can take it away, 
and can do so for no reason at all. Boards may structure transac-
tions for the sole purpose of limiting the ability of shareholders to 
perfect appraisal rights.33  
The board may also decide, on its own or at the behest of a ma-
jority shareholder, to buy out the shares of the minority share-
holders even if this is not in the best interests of minority share-
 
31 See D.G.C.L. §271 (giving shareholders who vote no on certain business 
combination transactions the right to a judicial appraisal process of the value of 
their shares at the time of the transaction). 
32 Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 613-16 (1998) (“The origin of the ap-
praisal remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate law to majority ap-
proval of fundamental corporate changes, and away from a requirement of 
unanimous shareholder consent. When unanimous approval was no longer 
required, and shareholders effectively lost their individual right to veto corpo-
rate changes, the appraisal remedy was provided to them in return.”). 
33 See, e.g., Hariton v. ARCO Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) 
(rejecting business purpose test and de facto merger doctrine court blesses. the 
Delaware Supreme Court blessed a transaction structured as an asset sale 
(where selling firm shareholders get no appraisal rights) instead of a merger 
(where they do)). This particular ability to act in a way that is contrary to 
shareholder interests has not been accepted in all jurisdictions, even those 
with similar statutes, precisely because the act of disenfranchisement or dis-
abling of important rights is viewed as antithetical to the fiduciary-based di-
rectorial mission. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 181, 1200, 1201, 1300 (West 1990) 
(creating voting and appraisal rights parity among different business combi-
nation transactions to discourage transaction design intended to limit statutory 
and common law rights of shareholders). 
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holders.34 It may do so even without stating a business purpose 
and without any consideration as to the impact on minority 
shareholders. As the Delaware Supreme Court has held on many 
occasions, “[i]t is . . . settled under Delaware law that minority 
stock interests may be eliminated by merger.”35 It also may do so 
without sharing the control premium: controlling shareholders, 
who also owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, may sell 
their control shares without sharing control premium with the 
minority.36 
In day-to-day activities, long-term project choices, and funda-
mental transactions, boards may prefer long-term shareholders 
over short-term shareholders or vice versa. There is no ready 
check on this ability to choose which type of shareholder to pre-
fer. In addition, the board or a director may even engage in self-
dealing transactions, subject only to the requirement that the 
transaction is fair to the corporation as an entity.37 
Shareholders may also waive their rights to the duties they are 
owed, something that sits uncomfortably with the notion of a fi-
duciary. The ability to waive is seen neither in the law of trusts 
nor in any other area where fiduciary duties have bite.38 Indeed, 
 
34 To cite just a few of the innumerable examples, a buyout may have se-
vere tax consequences for minority shareholders or may deprive minority 
shareholders of potential appreciation in the firm’s shares. 
35 Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Group, 474 A.2d 133, 135-36 (Del. 1984). 
36 See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979). 
While inconsistent with traditional notions of fiduciary duty, these decisions 
likely vindicate the investor’s ex ante bargain. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 7, at 119, 126 (“[I]f control transactions produce gains and gains de-
pend upon unequal allocation, then expected wealth maximized by a rule 
allowing unequal allocation; all shareholders enjoy higher share prices ex ante 
and they may deal with any risk by holding a diversified portfolio of invest-
ments.”). 
37 See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“In a typical 
derivative suit involving a transaction between a director and her corporation, 
that director is interested because she is on the other side of the transaction 
from the corporation and faces liability if the entire fairness standard applies, 
regardless of her subjective good faith, so long as she cannot prove that the 
transaction was fair to the corporation.” (emphasis added)). 
38 See DEMOTT, supra note 24. 
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several of corporate law’s most famous cases are about explicit or 
implicit waivers of duties owed by directors or majority share-
holders. For example, in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., Ingle 
was hired to run the firm and was appointed a director.39 As part 
of his employment contract, Ingle agreed to sell back his shares to 
the firm if he left for any reason.40 When Ingle was forced out 
many years later in a corner-office coup, he challenged his termi-
nation on the ground that he was, as a minority shareholder, 
owed a fiduciary duty by the firm and was protected against op-
portunistic conduct by them.41 The court rejected his plea, holding 
in effect that whatever fiduciary duties Ingle was owed as a mi-
nority shareholder were waived through his employment con-
tract.42 
Similarly, in Gallagher v. Lambert, an employee of a closely held 
firm entered into an employment agreement and a buy-sell 
agreement, which provided that for the first three years of his 
employment his shares would have to be sold back at book 
value.43 When the firm fired him just three weeks before the 
buyback period ended (taking about $3 million in potential profits 
from him), the employee-shareholder sued, claiming a breach of 
fiduciary duty.44 The court rejected the claim. The shareholder 
had effectively waived his fiduciary duties by entering into the 
shareholder agreement—in other words, the parties’ contract 
“define[d] the scope of the relevant fiduciary duty.”45  
 
39 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (N.Y. 1989) (“[the parties] entered into a written 
shareholders’ agreement which provided that…Glamore would nominate and 
vote Ingle as a director…of the corporation”). 
40 See id. at 1312 (The agreement gave Glamore “the right to repurchase all 
of Ingle's stock if ‘Ingle shall cease to be an employee of the Corporation for 
any reason’.”). 
41 See id. at 1312-1313. 
42 See id. at 1313 (holding that a “minority shareholder in a close corpora-
tion, by that status alone, who contractually agrees to the repurchase of his 
shares upon termination of his employment for any reason, acquires no right 
from the corporation or majority shareholders against at-will discharge.”). 
43 549 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1989). 
44 See id. at 137. 
45 See id. 
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Boards can engage in a variety of maneuverings with the cor-
porate form that allow them to change the rights of shareholders 
in ways that may not be in the shareholders’ financial interest.46 
For example, in a recapitalization, the board can, by creating a 
shell corporation with a new financial structure and then merging 
the old firm into the shell, eliminate a particular class of stock.47 
Firms may also reincorporate to a more management friendly 
state like Delaware, even if this is not in the interests of a particu-
lar class of shareholders. 
Boards can also act in ways that are overtly beneficial to credi-
tors, who in the traditional account are owed no extra-contractual 
duties and whose contract rights would seem to be trumped by 
any shareholder fiduciary rights. For one, creditors can bargain 
for voting trusts and thereby gain control of the board.48 The 
whole point of such devices is to put in place directors who will 
not do what the shareholders want. A bankruptcy filing, which 
directors make and which destroys all shareholder value for the 
benefit of creditors, is just the culmination of creditor-preferring 
behavior.49 This ability to control the shut-down decision sits un-
comfortably with the claim that creditor-appointed directors can-
not act in ways beneficial to those who put them on the board.  
 
46 The ability of the board to engage in single-firm reorganizations or re-
capitalizations varies by state.  
47 See, e.g., Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940) 
(permitting firm to eliminate preferred stock, and its dividend arrearages, 
through recapitalization). 
48 This most commonly occurs in firms in financial distress, but nothing prevents 
this from being used in healthy or near-healthy firms. See BAIRD & RASMUSSEN, supra 
note 12 at 1215 (describing the control creditors exercise in financially dis-
tressed firms); see also M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Execu-
tive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, __ N.W. L. REV. __, ___ (2007) 
(same).  
49 There are a few rare Chapter 11 cases in which shareholders do enjoy 
some recovery, but this remote possibility does not mean that the directors are 
somehow acting on the shareholder’s behalf. In any event, in a perfectly stan-
dard prepackaged bankruptcy in which equity is wiped out, the directors ap-
prove a course of conduct that cannot possibly be in the shareholders’ interest, 
yet no one suggests approving the filing of such a bankruptcy petition consti-
tutes a violation of their fiduciary duties.  
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Existing law then leaves us in a peculiar place. As a general 
matter, shareholders lose when they complain about decisions of 
directors that are wealth maximizing for the corporation as a 
whole, but contrary to the interests of the common shareholders. 
At the same time, however, courts continue to give lip-service to 
the idea that directors act for the benefit of the shareholders. Just 
last May, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court noted, “[t]he 
directors of Delaware corporations have the legal responsibility to 
manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its share-
holders owners. Accordingly, fiduciary duties are imposed upon 
the directors to regulate their conduct when they perform that 
function.”50 Hence, courts are asked to reconcile a core principle 
with accepted practices inconsistent with it.51 
B. 
The business judgment rule is the crutch courts use most often 
to navigate around the maxim that directors owe a fiduciary duty 
to shareholders, at times in ways that distort the idea of fiduciary 
duty beyond recognition. One of the best known examples is the 
old chestnut of Shlensky v. Wrigley. The plaintiff challenged the 
Wrigley board’s refusal to install lights at Wrigley Field, home of 
the Chicago Cubs baseball team, despite the fact that every other 
 
50 See North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v. 
Gheewalla, 2007 WL 1453705, *7 (Del. May 18, 2007) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotes omitted). For an argument that the confusion generated by 
applying fiduciary duties to creditors justifies an elimination of all derivative 
rights of shareholders, see Ann E. Conway, “Trenwalla: A Call for Rationaliz-
ing Fiduciary Duties to Creditors in Delaware” (Jun. 4, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991224.  
51 Another basis for the shareholder-only nature of fiduciary duties is that 
shareholder contracts, insofar as they exist, are more open ended and am-
biguous than creditor contracts, and fiduciary duties are merely judicial gap 
fillers of contracts that would be too costly to write in detail. See EASTERBROOK 
& FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 90–93. Judges are thus delegated the job of writing 
ex post contracts because writing them ex ante would be impossible or too ex-
pensive. This rationale, insofar as it obtains for shareholders, is becoming less 
unique to shareholders as credit derivatives and other financial innovations 
blur the lines between debt and equity. In other words, holders of debt are 
increasingly dispersed and disinterested in the way shareholders are, and 
credit contracts are containing fewer and fewer contractual restrictions and 
specifications. See [Henderson (2007)]. 
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team played night games, and playing at night seemed to be the 
value maximizing strategy.52 Defendant board members did not 
argue that their actions were actually value maximizing for 
shareholders (say, through building a unique brand), but rather 
grounded their argument in the idiosyncratic preferences of 
Wrigley’s majority owner—that baseball is a day-time game and 
that lights would hurt the surrounding community.53 The board 
effectively flaunted the fact that it was deliberately not trying to 
maximize shareholder value.54  
The court granted the board’s motion to dismiss, establishing a 
strong business judgment rule that prevents plaintiffs from even 
inquiring into the rationale for the board’s decision.55 Plaintiffs 
got nowhere with their argument that directors were favoring 
others (in this case, non-investors like the game of baseball or the 
neighborhood, and certainly the idiosyncratic preferences of one 
shareholder) over shareholders.56 Because of the business judg-
ment rule, board members also have the authority to donate to 
charity, which is one view of what Mr. Wrigley was doing, and 
 
52 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. 1968) (compared to the Chicago White Sox, 
“[t]he weekend attendance figures for the two teams were similar; however, 
the White Sox week-night games drew many more patrons than did the Cubs' 
weekday games.”). 
53 See id. at 778 (“Wrigley [] refused to install lights, not because of interest 
in the welfare of the corporation but because of his personal opinions ‘that 
baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the installation of lights and night base-
ball games will have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighbor-
hood.’”). 
54 See id. (“It is alleged that he has admitted that he is not interested in 
whether the Cubs would benefit financially from such action.”). 
55 See id. at 780 (stating that absent a showing of fraud, illegality or conflict 
of interest, a decision properly before the directors was “beyond [the court’s] 
jurisdiction and ability.”). 
56 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 1245 (2002) 
(arguing that the plaintiffs’ inability to surpass a motion to dismiss shows that 
the business judgment rule is an abstention doctrine—that courts don’t even 
inquire into business decisions that are made in good faith). 
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take other actions that do not need to be justified in terms of 
shareholder wealth maximization.57 
The business judgment rule also gives boards wide latitude in 
determining what litigation is conducted by shareholders on be-
half of the corporation. The rule permits boards, in most in-
stances, to curtail litigation that might benefit shareholders. 
Boards enjoy near carte blanche to avoid derivative suits against 
the firm that might be in the interest of one class of stakeholders, 
say the shareholders, but contrary to the interests of another 
class, say the creditors, or vice versa. 58 
Under the shield of the business judgment rule, the board can 
even take actions that deliberately benefit creditors at the expense 
of shareholders, so long as the decision is based in facts, well con-
sidered, in good faith, and not conflicted by any personal interests 
of a majority of directors.59 Even decisions that seem plainly to 
 
57 See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (refusing 
to review gift to Princeton University by small manufacturing company 
whose CEO was an alumnus). Of course, charitable contributions and other 
such actions could be justified on shareholder wealth maximization grounds, 
such as building brand or employee loyalty, but the law does not require this. 
For example, Delaware empowers boards to donate to charity without regard 
to its purpose. See D.G.C.L. §122(9) (“Every corporation created under this 
chapter shall have power to: . . .(9) Make donations for the public welfare or 
for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other 
national emergency in aid thereof; . . .”). 
58 While the demand-requirement process is complicated, the practical es-
sence is that well-advised plaintiffs do not make a demand in a derivative 
case. Making demand is an admission that demand is required, and the board 
may refuse demand under the shield of the business judgment rule. So if the 
plaintiffs make a demand, they lose, even if the lawsuit is fairly clearly in the 
best interests of shareholders. In almost all cases, therefore, plaintiffs will 
plead that demand was futile, alleging that the board was interested, tainted 
by a dominating shareholder or director who has a conflict, or the board is 
otherwise incapable of making a decision that is in the best interest of the cor-
poration. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996). 
59 See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS at 414-15 (discussing 
state stakeholder constituency statutes). 
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hurt shareholders are protected by the business judgment rule, as 
long as the procedural predicates are met.60  
As one court noted, the business judgment rule “bars judicial 
inquiry into actions . . . in the . . . legitimate furtherance of corpo-
rate purposes.”61 The important pressure point here is the word 
“corporate,” which speaks to the value of the corporation as a 
whole, as opposed to the value of its constituent parts. A leading 
commentator defines fiduciary duties as “a bargained-for term of 
the board-shareholder contract by which the directors agree not 
to make Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions that leave shareholders 
worse off.”62 But the business judgment rule in operation is 
plainly inconsistent with this definition. Indeed, applying this con-
ception of the business judgment rule, even with a highly defer-
ential standard of review, would unsettle many well-established 
practices.  
The business judgment rule, however, is an awkward tool for 
giving directors the legal guidance they need to make good deci-
sions. Deferring to the director’s judgment is not the same as ac-
knowledging that under some circumstances the proper decision 
runs counter to the shareholder’s interest. Among other things, 
many directors want to do what they are supposed to do. That 
the business judgment rule would protect them even if they did 
something that ran counter to their duties is not what matters to 
them.  
Moreover, the business judgment rule invites circumlocution. 
Consider directors who make a decision they believe is in the best 
interest of the corporation as a whole (and consistent with the in-
vestors’ ex ante bargain) but contrary to the interests of share-
holders. Given the fiduciary duty maxim and its pervasiveness, 
overt recognition by the directors that they are not acting in the 
 
60 See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 
1976) (holding that director decision to distribute dividend of subsidiary stock 
was protected by the business judgment rule, despite the fact that the firm 
retaining the stock and marking it to market would have saved shareholders 
about $8 million).  
61 Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.3d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984). 
62 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 336, 359 (2007). 
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interest of shareholders is best avoided. Instead of clear-headed 
analysis, discussion becomes couched in terms that are somewhat 
tortured, but less likely to make waves. This phenomenon has un-
fortunately become all too common in many areas of corporate 
law.63 Turning board meetings into games in which many actions 
are taken and much money spent merely to give legal cover to 
decisions is wasteful and erodes confidence in law and process in 
general. In addition, directors may come to believe that the 
games are real, which may lead them to take actions that destroy 
firm value. 
II. 
In recent years, courts have been forced in some cases to re-
treat from the traditional account of fiduciary duties being owed 
exclusively to shareholders. For the most part, they have tried to 
do this by finding fidicuiary duties are sometimes owed others.64 
The facts of Central Ice Cream provide an excellent illustration of 
the problem the courts have faced and how they have confronted 
it.65  
The Central Ice Cream Company owed its general creditors 
about $12 million.66 It had closed its door, and its only asset was a 
lawsuit against McDonald’s. Central Ice Cream prevailed at trial 
and received a $52 million judgment. At this point, McDonald’s 
made a settlement offer of $16 million. The general creditors, as 
one might expect, wanted it accepted post haste. If Central Ice 
Cream took the offer, they would be paid in full. By contrast, if 
 
63 In one of corporate law’s most famous cases, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held directors personally liable for agreeing to sell a struggling firm in 
a terrible industry at a huge premium for shareholders. See Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The lesson for directors from such cases is 
not to reject similar deals when they come along, but to go through the mo-
tions of getting advice from bankers and lawyers, shopping the firm to other 
buyers, and acting in the ways that the law says they must. 
64 See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 
No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at p. 34 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
65 In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987). 
66 This hypothetical has been one of the central fixtures of corporate law 
over the last decade. It is set out in Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 
n.55.  
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Central turned it down, the judgment might be reversed on ap-
peal and leave them with nothing. The shareholders, again none 
too surprisingly, wanted the offer rejected. They would receive 
only $4 million if the settlement offer were accepted, but they 
would get more than $40 million if Central refused to settle and 
ultimately prevailed on appeal. Getting the $40 million was not 
certain, but risking $4 million to get $40 million with reasonable 
odds is a good bet. 
Neither the shareholders nor the creditors of Central Ice 
Cream are the residual claimants over all dimensions. More im-
portantly, neither group will act with the interest of the other in 
mind. To see this clearly, tweak the facts slightly and assume that 
the settlement offer was for exactly $12 million. If each type of in-
vestor cared only about its own economic interests, the creditors 
would accept the offer and the shareholders would reject it, re-
gardless of the company’s chances of prevailing in the end.  
For the judge that had to confront this problem (Frank Easter-
brook), there was an easy answer. Central Ice Cream was in 
bankruptcy, and bankruptcy law requires the trustee to maximize 
the value of the estate. Hence, she need only assess the settlement 
offer on its merits. If, for example, the settlement offer were for 
exactly one quarter of the judgment, she need ask simply 
whether Central has a better than twenty-five percent chance of 
prevailing on appeal.67 Central Ice Cream does not speak directly to 
directors’ obligations outside of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinion sends a strong message cautioning against 
considering only the interests of shareholders in corporate deci-
sionmaking, and the Delaware chancellors listened.68 
 
67 We are oversimplifying here, of course. We assume that the appeal is an 
all-or-nothing affair and that there are no costs associated with such an appeal. 
These do not change the underlying problem, 
68 The evidence for this is indirect. The Delaware courts have not cited Cen-
tral Ice Cream, but merely converted its facts into a hypothetical (including 
numbers that make it extremely unlikely that it was a mere coincidence). For 
his part, while long a major voice in corporate law, now-Chief Judge Easter-
brook has never shown any sign he is even aware of the controversy Central 
Ice Cream has spawned. 
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Several years after Central Ice Cream, a Delaware chancellor in 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp. con-
sidered the Central Ice Cream problem and suggested that in such 
situations, those in which the business is in the “zone of insol-
vency,” the duties of the directors run to the creditors as well as 
to the shareholders.69 Hence, directors who use their best judg-
ment do not violate their duties even if the decision favors credi-
tors at the expense of shareholders:  
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicin-
ity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely 
the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its 
duty to the corporate enterprise.70 
The court posited a set of facts like those in Central Ice Cream and 
explained:  
 [I]f we consider the community of interests that the 
corporation represents it seems apparent that one 
should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement 
offer . . . . But that result will not be reached by a di-
rector who thinks he owes duties directly to share-
holders only. It will be reached by directors who are 
capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and 
economic entity. Such directors will recognize that in 
managing the business affairs of a solvent corpora-
tion in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may 
arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) 
course to follow for the corporation may diverge 
from the choice that the stockholders (or the credi-
tors, or the employees, or any single group interested 
 
69 The court was not writing on an entirely blank slate. Before Credit Lyon-
nais courts had previously noted that the duty of the directors shifts to credi-
tors when the corporation is insolvent. See, e.g., Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 
633 (4th Cir.1945); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982). This 
doctrine had (and continues to have) little bite in practice both because of the 
business judgment rule and because it is usually hard to tell whether a firm is 
in fact insolvent. 
70 Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613 at *34. 
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in the corporation) would make if given the opportu-
nity to act.71 
The difficulty—one that the courts have wrestled with ever 
since Credit Lyonnais—is making operational sense of this obser-
vation.72 Assume, for example, that McDonald’s puts on the table 
a settlement offer that is less than what the creditors are owed. 
Can a director reject it out of hand on the ground that it is leaves 
the shareholders with nothing? The Delaware Supreme Court de-
cided this year that a creditor never has a direct action in such a 
case, but it left the door open for allowing them to bring a deriva-
tive action against such a director.73  
The ability of creditors to bring an action against the directors, 
however, is not the question that courts usually confront when 
the interests of both creditors and shareholders are implicated. 
The facts of Credit Lyonnais present the problem in its typical 
form. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., the defendant in the 
case, found itself in difficult financial straits. The firm-saving deal 
ultimately reached between the banks and the principal share-
holder excluded the latter from exercising control rights until a 
specified amount of debt was paid down. This shareholder urged 
the directors to sell enough of the assets of the business to return 
him to power. The directors refused on the ground that the sale 
of assets was not in the interests of the corporation as a whole.  
The creditors had no need to call upon courts to ensure that the 
directors paid attention to their interests. They had set things up 
so that the directors would look out for them—provided that a 
court did not interfere. To protect the creditors’ interests—and to 
vindicate the ex ante bargain—the court needed only a reason to 
 
71 Id. at *34 n.55. 
72 For an analysis of the way Credit Lyonnais redirects the board’s focus 
without actually imposing legal liability, see Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expres-
sive Function of Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. --- 
(2007). 
73 See North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v. 
Gheewalla, 2007 WL 1453705, *7 (Del. May 18, 2007). Of course, only directors 
who are extremely badly advised can ever be tagged with liability. As long 
as the directors go through the motions and assert that they assessed the set-
tlement offer in light of the interests of everyone, they will be protected by 
the business judgment rule. 
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refrain from acting. Instead of seeking to impose liability on the 
directors, the creditors wanted to ensure that liability would not 
be imposed on the directors for decisions they made that favored 
them. In other words, fiduciary duties to shareholders stood in 
the way of free and efficient contracting. 
By asserting that fiduciary duties turn on the identity of the re-
sidual claimant (and that creditors are therefore also owed duties 
when the firm is in the “zone of insolvency”), a court avoids hav-
ing to use the business judgment rule in circumstances when a de-
cision, however sensible, is transparently contrary to the interests 
of the shareholders. It is, however, far from being a satisfactory 
solution to the problem. One cannot simply transplant the duties 
ordinarily owed shareholders to creditors even when they are 
unambiguously the residual claimants. The positions of creditors 
and shareholders are not the same. They typically enjoy radically 
different control rights, different information, different bargain-
ing positions, and different risk profiles. Hence, we should not as-
sume that the running default obligations of directors to creditors 
parallel to those owed shareholders is value-maximizing ex ante.  
Most of those who attack Credit Lyonnais have failed to appre-
ciate the dynamic the court confronted. The creditors were not 
asserting that the directors owed them a duty, merely that notion 
of fiduciary duty owed shareholders should not prevent the direc-
tors from taking actions that were in their interest and in the in-
terest of the firm as a whole. When creditors are the residual 
owners they do not need the affirmative protection of fiduciary 
duties, but rather a rule that ensures the contractual mechanisms 
they put in place operate effectively, and contractual mechanisms 
do operate effectively, as long as courts do not create duties owed 
anyone else that interfere with them.  
This observation suggests that corporate law should follow the 
lead of Judge Easterbrook in Central Ice Cream: The duties of the 
directors should go towards all the investors as a group, that is, to 
the firm.74 Their duty is analogous to the principle in the law of 
 
74 Judge Easterbrook, however, was not expressly advocating this idea as a 
principle of corporate law. As noted, Central Ice Cream is a bankruptcy case. 
Moreover, as a sitting judge, Easterbrook is not free to reflect on first princi-
ples. 
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trusts known as “the duty of impartiality.” This is a duty that 
pushes trustees in the direction of considering the trust as a 
whole: A creates a trust where the income is to be distributed to B 
during her lifetime, with the principal distributed to C upon B’s 
death. The trustee has duties running to both beneficiaries and 
their interests conflict.75 The trustee may, for example, be forced 
to choose between an investment that offers high current income 
and one that offers long-term growth.  
Other things equal, the trustee should try to maximize the 
value of the trust as a whole. In the case of trusts, other things are 
often not equal. If B is an elderly widow and C an entirely self-
sufficient adult child, the trustee would be remiss if the trust gen-
erated no current income, even if this course would maximize the 
expected value of the trust. Maximizing value under these circum-
stances runs counter to any sensible interpretation of the settlor’s 
intent. The law of trusts does not require the trustee to act roboti-
cally or without regard to the particular needs and interests of 
those for whom she is taking care. Rather the trustee’s obligation 
is to “act impartially and with due regard for the diverse benefi-
cial interests created by the terms of the trust.”76  
Value-maximization makes more sense in the corporate con-
text. Investors can diversify their portfolios to protect themselves 
 
75 See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. 
ASCHER, SCOTT & ASCHER ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS §17.15, at 1259, §20.1 (5th ed. 
2007). There is a related literature on common agency. See supra note 21. 
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §79. An interesting modern example is 
the battle for control of Dow Jones, Inc., the publisher of, among other things, 
the Wall Street Journal. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch made a bid for Dow 
Jones at $60 per share in cash (it was trading at about $34 before the offer). 
The complication was that about 64 percent of Dow Jones shares were held in 
various trusts for descendents of the Bancroft family. Some of the family 
members—the young ones generally—preferred the cash, while other family 
members—the old ones generally—valued the “journalistic integrity” of the 
paper, so objected to it falling into the hands of the controversial Mr. Murdoch. 
In this case, the conflicting issue for the trustee is not different monetary 
valuations, but money versus idiosyncratic preferences. The problem is just as 
severe. We can’t imagine the law doing much here, short of holding the trus-
tee liable when she abdicates her job entirely. We imagine a similar rule sup-
planting the traditional account of fiduciary duty— to avoid legal liability di-
rectors must show up, work hard, and not line their own pockets. 
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in the event maximizing firm value turns out to favor one class of 
investors over another.77 A court after the fact may have no easy 
way to tell whether the directors in fact used their best judgment 
to maximize firm value. A director may not perform as well if she 
must worry whether each decision maximizes firm value.78 
Hence, the idea that fiduciary duties are owed the firm should be 
coupled with a relatively forgiving business judgment rule. 
III. 
In the last part, we suggested that corporate law might sensibly 
adopt the principle that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration as a whole. They are obliged to make decisions that 
maximize the value of the entire pie, not any particular slice. The 
exact contours of the duty turns in some measure on how the 
business judgment rule is applied, but the benchmark is easy to 
state. In this part, however, we suggest that this conception of di-
rectors’ duties is far from self-evident. Among other things, it 
seems inconsistent with important features of standard venture-
capital contracts. These contracts are especially illuminating. They 
are heavily negotiated by informed and sophisticated parties, are 
made in a highly competitive environment, and are extremely 
specific about the allocation of control rights at a time in the firm’s 
 
77 See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotradi-
tional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999). Smith ar-
gues that since investors are presumed to hold a market basket of securities, 
the average investor’s portfolio will have the same equity holdings to debt 
holdings ratio as the average equity to debt ratio in the capital structure of 
firms. Accordingly, an investor who loses as a shareholder in one firm will 
make it up as a debt holder in that firm or in the fortunes of another firm. 
Alon Chaves and Jesse Fried add an important coda to Smith’s argument, not-
ing that “performance creditors”, that is, those owed contractual performance 
instead of cash, should be considered in any analysis of fiduciary duties. See 
Alon Chaves & Jesse M. Fried, Managers’ Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm’s Insol-
vency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813 (2002).  
78 This is just a standard observation about agency costs. Any mechanism 
put in place to ensure that the value of the firm is at all times optimized comes 
at some cost. Everyone may be better off ex ante if someone with expertise has 
discretion even if her incentives distort decisionmaking to some extent. See, 
e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory Of The Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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life—its formation—when these issues are crucial.79 Orban v. Field, 
illustrates the problem of applying fiduciary duties to the firm as a 
whole.80 
In Orban, the court considered an allegation of a breach of fidu-
ciary duty brought by a shareholder who claimed the board, 
dominated by preferred shareholders, favored their own interests 
at the expense of common shareholders.81 Office Mart, the firm at 
issue in the case, was a big box supplier of stationery supplies that 
tried to expand its operations and failed. The board backed a 
merger transaction with office supply giant Staples, but the 
amount realized from the sale was not enough to satisfy the liq-
uidation preferences of the preferred stockholders. As a result, if 
the deal went through, the common stockholders would get 
nothing.  
Staples required that the merger be approved by over ninety 
percent of Office Mart shareholders. To make this possible, the 
Office Mart board gave cash to its preferred shareholders to buy 
warrants to dilute the common shareholders below ten percent, 
thus ensuring approval of the merger. The largest common 
stockholder brought suit against the directors, pointing out that 
this action on the part of the directors, along with others, had the 
effect of bringing about a transaction that wiped out his interest 
entirely and therefore violated the duty they owed him. Moreo-
ver, the directors themselves were holders of preferred stock and 
stood to benefit from the transaction with Staples. Hence, they 
violated their duty of loyalty as well as their duty of care, and the 
business judgment rule was therefore unavailable. Nevertheless, 
the court upheld the board’s actions. In doing so, it had to ac-
knowledge that a board could indeed take actions (such as im-
plementing a change in the corporate charter needed to accom-
 
79 The other crucial time in a firm’s life is its death, and financial distress 
raises the same issues. Not surprisingly, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
have firm death in mind when bargaining for control rights at firm creation. 
80 No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Apr. 1, 1997). 
81 Id. at *2-*3 (plaintiffs’ claim “asserts that the board, which was controlled 
by holders of preferred stock, exercised corporate power against the common 
and in favor of the preferred and, thus, breached a duty of loyalty to the 
common.”). 
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modate the prospective buyer) that were manifestly contrary to 
the interests of the principal common shareholder82:  
A board may certainly deploy corporate power 
against its own shareholders in some circumstances—
the greater good justifying the action—but when it 
does, it should be required to demonstrate that it 
acted both in good faith and reasonably.83 
The court grounded this decision—that the board had acted in 
good faith and in reasonable way—in part on the fact that the 
preferred shareholders were themselves not being paid in full. Of 
course this should not be sufficient, or maybe even relevant. Even 
though the preferreds were taking something of a hit by selling 
immediately, their incentives were still distorted. An immediate 
sale always involves trading off the costs of waiting with the pro-
spective benefits. The preferreds suffered all of the former, but 
reap only a small part of the latter. Merely observing that they 
enjoyed part of the upside does not tell us whether they made the 
proper decision.  
There were facts in Orban that made things easier for the court. 
The principal shareholder did not dispute that the transaction was 
in fact the best course for the corporation as a whole.84 The num-
ber of prospective buyers (other big box office supply stores) was 
small, so the deal may have been one of last resort. Moreover, the 
common shareholder seems to have acted badly. The shareholder 
gave his implicit support for the deal, only to withdraw it later 
merely in an effort to extract some of the purchase price from the 
preferreds.85 
The willingness of the court to stand behind the directors in 
Orban, however, makes sense without any of this. Office Mart had 
 
82 See id. at *29. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at *26, n.23 (“There is no claim that . . . the merger . . . was not in 
the best interests of the corporation.”) 
85 See id. at *21 (“it is clear that negotiations ensued in which Mr. Orban at-
tempted to extract a payment of $ 4 million from the company in exchange for 
his agreement to support the merger.”). 
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a governance structure that, like most venture-back deals,86 de-
parted dramatically for the typical one in which power is centered 
on the common shareholders. One explanation is that venture 
capitalists generally own preferred as well as common stock (or 
various convertible varieties thereof); while the entrepre-
neur/founder has only common stock.87 In addition, preferred as 
well common stockholders vote. Hence, when the venture capi-
talist controls the majority of the preferred and common com-
bined, the levers of power are in the hands of senior investors, 
even though they are not the residual owners of the business. 
Venture capital contracts take other forms as well, but they do 
share one essential feature. When firms are distressed (whether 
they are insolvent, near insolvent, or not), control always resides 
with the senior owner, not the residual owner. Giving the venture 
capitalists or other senior investors the ability to pull the plug in 
bad states of the world is an unambiguous part of the ex ante in-
vestment contract. 
This governance structure comes with an obvious downside. A 
board that acts on behalf of a senior investor will tend to play it 
safe. Directors will resist taking on new projects or even agreeing 
to keep the firm operational, as they enjoy none of the upside and 
suffer the consequences if things go badly.88 In a case such as Or-
ban, we can see how this may distort decisionmaking. The busi-
 
86 For a general discussion of venture capital structures and exit strategies, 
see D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 315 (2005). More and more firms are seeing radical changes to their fi-
nancial structure as a result of the surge in private equity investments and 
going-private transactions. (In terms of the corporate finance issues discussed 
herein, venture capital and private equity investments are similar.) The prob-
lems of senior investors holding tranches of debt and equity, along with board 
seats, conversion rights, and other contracted-for rights, participating with 
common shareholders is likely to become much more common in light of 
these trends. 
87 One of these reasons is tax. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency 
Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 984–86 
(2006) (“[T]he use of preferred stock rather than common stock can reduce the 
tax cost of equity-based incentive compensation given to founders and other 
employees of the startup.”). 
88 See SMITH, supra note 86. 
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ness was worth enough to pay the preferred shareholders more 
than ninety percent of what they were owed if sold immedi-
ately.89 From the perspective of the preferred stockholders, the 
additional energy and monies spent on finding a buyer would not 
be well spent. They faced all the downside from waiting, while 
someone else (the principal common shareholder) would enjoy 
most of the upside. Of course, the principal common shareholder 
took the opposite view. He had nothing to gain from the sale, so 
waiting for a better offer could only make him better off.  
In venture capital deals, everyone begins knowing that things 
may not work out and the time to shut down or sell out may 
come. And, as discussed above, no one type of investor has per-
fect incentives. Nevertheless, someone must be able to make this 
decision, even though no one’s incentives are perfectly aligned. 
The deals struck suggest that the comparative advantage belongs 
to the venture capitalist. They always retain control over the 
shutdown decision in bad states of the world. Venture capitalists 
are repeat players and they may be best able to decide when to 
pull the plug, notwithstanding their skewed incentives.90 In light 
 
89 See Orban, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 at *23-*24 (“the company extended 
sufficient consideration to the Series C holders ($ 3,013,995) to enable them to 
exercise warrants to permit them, as a group, to hold more than 90% of Office 
Mart's outstanding common stock.”). 
90 We have in mind here the story of the mission of Apollo 12. Lightening 
struck the rocket carrying the Apollo 12 module shortly after takeoff causing 
the computers on board to shut down. A quick-thinking engineer at Mission 
Control suggested a fix, but the commander of the mission, Pete Conrad, did 
not know the procedure. Conrad, whose hand was on the abort switch, waited 
just long enough for fellow astronaut Alan Bean to hit the right switches and 
save the mission. See 
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/spacecraft/q0140.shtml. Just as in 
the corporate context, someone must have a hand on the abort switch. We can 
imagine a voting mechanism among the astronauts or by mission control ex-
ecutives or engineers, with accompanying arguments about experience, per-
spective, optimism, dispassion, residual loss bearers, information, and so on. 
Although stories could be told about why one decision mechanism or another 
is best, outsiders should be careful about meddling in the choice of experi-
enced professionals and should be very leery about writing rules that inhibit 
choice. Although the analogy here is imperfect, it shows how decision rules 
are complex and difficult to unpack from all of the other elements of a success-
ful space (or corporate) endeavor. 
30  /  Baird & Henderson 
of this contracting regularity, it would seem odd for courts to 
stand in the way. 
Orban seems to stand for the proposition that directors can 
take actions that are in the best interests of the corporation as a 
whole even when they take actions that are manifestly self-
interested or favor non-fiduciaries over fiduciaries.91 But to take 
advantage of this rule, the directors may be forced to show the 
“entire fairness” of the transaction to the corporation as a 
whole.92 It is consistent with idea that directors should make deci-
sions that are value-maximizing ex post.  
But this may not get things quite right. The founders of the 
firm take an equity stake, which in most cases gives them an in-
centive to manage well, but giving venture capitalists an option to 
exercise control rights in some bad states of the world, even when 
their exercise would destroy firm value, may give the founders or 
their agents an extra incentive to do well. In other words, selfish 
control rights may be given to senior claimants to give junior 
claimants (including shareholder-managers) an added motivation 
to avoid bad states of the world. 
This theory is supported by other contracts we observe. Well-
established models of debt posit that loan covenants serve as trip 
wires.93 If actually tripped, value is lost, but the trip wires need to 
exist in order to give those in control the right incentives. It is but 
a small step to recognize that when senior investors succeed to 
control, they will also act in a way that is not necessarily value-
maximizing ex post. No one doubts that loan covenants, even 
those that are value reducing ex post, should be enforced and that 
they may in fact vindicate the ex ante bargain. The exercise of 
control rights by senior investors may operate in the same way.   
 
91 See Orban, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 at *29. 
92 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d. 701 (Del. 1983) (requiring de-
fendants in entire fairness inquiry to show that the transaction in question was 
“entirely fair to the corporation.”). 
93 See, e.g., George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in In-
teractive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1995) (arguing that 
loan covenants “serve as trip wires for the lender’s right to enforce or to inter-
vene in the borrower’s decisions.”). 
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While this is certainly a plausible explanation, we need not 
know the exact the reason why we see these control rights to pre-
sume that they are efficient. The fact that they are ubiquitous and 
have persevered in a highly competitive industry is enough to 
give corporate law pause before disrupting them. Whatever the 
reason for their existence, the evidence suggests that the venture 
capitalists bargained ex ante to act in the way the preferred 
shareholders did in Orban, without answering the question of 
whether the deal they struck was value-maximizing for the firm 
as a whole.94 Giving senior investors control rights at certain 
times may be efficient, even if they use these rights to serve their 
selfish ends at the expense of firm value. The granting of this real 
option to creditors may create just the right incentives for share-
holder managers to operate the firm efficiently in the first place.  
The ability to put in place directors who would engage in a sale 
that suited the interests of the preferred stockholders is not dif-
ferent from a secured creditor who bargains for the right to re-
possess collateral in the event of default and who can exercise that 
right without having to show that it is value-maximizing ex post. 
The founders/common shareholders agreed that if things went 
well, they would all get rich, but if things went badly, the inves-
tors would come first. Imposing fiduciary duties in this environ-
ment, even one that imposed a duty to the corporation as a whole 
 
94 This, of course, does not excuse some types of self-dealing on the part of 
the venture capitalist or any other senior investors. Consider the following 
scenario: the venture capitalist makes an initial investment in a startup, tak-
ing convertible preferred shares and a board seat. The venture capitalist 
board member dominates the board, reassuring other directors that funding 
options are abundant, while encouraging profligate spending, and all the 
while knowing that turning away deals is going to force the firm into despera-
tion, and thereby forcing the firm to agree to additional financing from the 
venture capital firm on onerous terms. The venture capital firm arranges a 
bridge loan to the firm, taking nearly free warrants that dilute entirely the 
value held by common shareholders. If the common shareholders could show 
that the deals the venture capitalist board member turned away were legiti-
mate, that the board process was insufficient, and that the board was domi-
nated by a director with a conflict of interest, it could overcome Orban, since 
the transaction in question was not the final deal, but the entirety of the firm’s 
search for financing.  
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and that came with a generous business judgment rule, is a poten-
tial source of mischief.  
IV. 
Ridding corporate law entirely of the idea of fiduciary duties 
would force the reconceptualization of a number of features of 
the law in ways that are potentially healthy. We consider one of 
these here—disclosure. Under current law, a director’s disclosure 
obligations are tied inexorably to their fiduciary duties. Hence, 
material nonpublic information must be disclosed when transact-
ing with shareholders, but not with creditors. As financial innova-
tion makes the difference between debt and equity less impor-
tant, this distinction is becoming increasingly hard to justify. A 
more sensible approach is one that decouples the disclosure obli-
gations from other duties and also makes it easier for sophisti-
cated professionals both to opt out of disclosure obligations and 
opt into them.95 Fiduciary duties restrict free contracting in ways 
that are plainly inefficient. 
A. 
The classic common law case on disclosure obligations is Good-
win v. Agassiz.96 In this case, the plaintiff learned negative news 
about the prospects for a mining company from a newspaper ar-
ticle, while two directors learned positive news from a confiden-
tial (that is, non-public) geological report.97 The directors bought 
shares through a broker on a stock exchange. The positive news 
eventually became public and the stock rose. The seller of the 
stock that the directors had acquired sued. He claimed that, be-
cause he was a shareholder at the time of the sale, the directors 
 
95 Easterbrook and Fischel reach a similar conclusion, albeit for different 
reasons. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 269–70 (“ ‘Fiduciary du-
ties’ are a questionable basis on which to distinguish insiders from outsiders. . 
. . It is not at all clear that the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
matches the class of trades that would be prohibited by contract . . . .”). 
96 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933). 
97 Id. at 659 (“They had certain knowledge, material as to the value of the 
stock, which the plaintiff did not have.”). 
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owed him a fiduciary duty and precluded them from trading with 
him when they possessed material information he did not.98  
The court rejected the claim. It distinguished the actions of the 
directors under these facts from the situation in which they had 
sought out the shareholder or where the corporation was obliged 
to disclose the information to the shareholders as a group: 
An honest director would be in a difficult situation if 
he could neither buy nor sell on the stock exchange 
shares of stock in his corporation without first seek-
ing out the other actual ultimate party to the transac-
tion and disclosing to him everything which a court 
knew or might later find that he then knew affecting 
the real or speculative value of such shares. Business 
of that nature is a matter to be governed by practical 
rules.99  
In recent decades, however, the law evolved in a different di-
rection. In a case with facts quite similar to Goodwin, the SEC 
brought an enforcement action against executives of a mining 
firm who traded on an anonymous stock exchange with investors 
who were at the same informational disadvantage—they did not 
know that a large ore deposit had been discovered on land that 
the firm was buying from unsuspecting farmers.100 The Second 
Circuit found the directors liable to the sellers of the stock, on the 
ground that the securities laws intended “that all members of the 
investing public should be subject to identical market risks” and 
 
98 Id. at 660 (“The contention of the plaintiff is that the purchase of his stock 
in the company by the defendants without disclosing to him as a stockholder 
their knowledge of the geologist's theory…constitute actionable wrong for 
which he as stockholder can recover.”).  
99 Id. at 661. The United States Supreme Court endorsed the rule that a dis-
closure obligation may exist in face-to-face transactions in Strong v. Repide, 213 
U.S. 419 (1909). The minority rule prevalent in a handful of states is that direc-
tors have a duty to disclose all material information to shareholders before 
trading with them. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903) (holding 
that a director must always disclose material facts when trading against a 
shareholder). 
100 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1969).  
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that investors had to trade “on an equal footing” with each 
other.101 
Several years later, the United States Supreme Court (with the 
help of then Deputy Solicitor General Frank Easterbrook102) rec-
ognized that requiring everyone to trade “on an equal footing” 
with one another cut much too broadly.103 Congress could not 
have intended “a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic infor-
mation.”104 Markets exist only if those with information are able 
to profit by trading on it.105 Moreover, trading by those with in-
formation brings the market into equilibrium and ensures that 
prices more accurately reflect underlying values. 
To cabin the reach of disclosure obligations under the securities 
laws, Justice Powell tied them to fiduciary duties: “Section 10(b) is 
aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be 
fraud.”106 He therefore found that a failure to disclose inside 
information triggered liability only if there were a duty to speak 
and this duty exists only “when one party has information that 
 
101 Id. at 852. 
102 Although representing the SEC, Easterbrook refused to argue the case 
on the broad grounds on which the government had one below and instead 
pressed for a conviction based on Chiarella’s misappropriation of inside in-
formation. Br. 70–71 n.48. Easterbrook left the Solicitor General’s office just 
before the brief was filed and hence his name does not actually appear on it. 
While the government did not prevail on this theory as the jury had not be 
instructed on it, the Court did direct the Court away from an inappropriately 
broad view of insider trading. 
103 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (“Formulation of such 
a broad duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty 
arises from a specific relationship between two parties…should not be under-
taken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.”). 
104 Id. at 233. 
105 No one invests in gathering information about securities if they cannot 
profit from trading on it. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND 
THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing that insider trading laws reduce incentives 
for investing in information about firm value). 
106 445 U.S. at 234–35 (1980). 
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the other . . . is entitled to know because of a fiduciary duty or 
other similar relation of trust and confidence.”107  
Over time, a tighter link between disclosure obligations and 
fiduciary duty has displaced the “practical rule” established in 
Goodwin.108 Under modern securities law, we can be fairly certain 
that if the corporation is in possession of information about the 
business that is material and nonpublic, it cannot engage in equity 
trading without disclosing it.109 Directors (acting for the firm) owe 
the firm’s existing shareholders fiduciary duties and therefore 
cannot disadvantage them for the benefit of the directors or even 
the firm. By contrast, a corporation is under no obligation to dis-
close information to strangers (such as the unsuspecting farmers 
who sell the mineral rights in the first instance).110 
 
107 Id. at 228. As the law has later developed, liability can also exist even if 
the person who trades violates a fiduciary duty he owes to someone other than 
the person with whom he is trading. For example, an employee who learns 
that his company is about to make a tender offer violates 10b-5 if he violates 
his obligations to his employee and purchases stock of the target. This source 
of liability is not relevant to our discussion here. 
108 Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661. 
109 The oddity of linking disclosure and fiduciary duties can be seen in the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion (again through the mind and pen of Judge Easter-
brook) in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987). In Jordan, a res-
ignation by the plaintiff led to a fairly simple contract dispute about a share-
holder agreement between a closely held firm and the plaintiff, who owned a 
few shares. The issue was whether the firm had to disclose information about 
inchoate merger negotiations when it bought back shares pursuant to the 
shareholder agreement, even though it made no promises to do so and the 
parties agreed on a set price for buy back of the shares. The court found a 
duty to disclose based on the syllogism: the employee was a shareholder, 
shareholders are owed fiduciary duties, and holders of fiduciary duties are 
owed disclosures that others aren’t. As discussed at length elsewhere, this con-
flation of fiduciary duties and disclosure is wrongheaded and leads to smallish 
state law contract cases becoming federal disclosure cases, as well as poten-
tially disrupting free contracting for investors and firms great and small. See 
M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps, ___ U. CHI. L REV. ___ 
(2007).  
110 See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817) (holding that contracting party 
had no duty to disclose material fact—in this case, the end of the War of 
1812—to a stranger on the other end of the bargain). 
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The tight linkage between disclosure obligations and fiduciary 
duties carries with it the implication that directors do not have 
disclosure obligations towards creditors, who aren’t owed fiduci-
ary duties generally. This is again almost right. Requiring disclo-
sure to creditors as a general matter surely cuts too far. It is al-
most impossible to enter into an economic relationship of any 
consequence without creditor-debtor relationship arising. A 
steady supplier who sells on open account is a creditor, as is a cus-
tomer who makes a deposit. It is but a short step from imposing 
an obligation to disclose to creditors to make an obligation to dis-
close to everyone. But what if a corporation in financial distress 
seeks to borrow additional money from an existing creditor who 
is, by any measure, a major stakeholder? In such cases, are they 
obliged to be more forthcoming than they would be to a com-
plete stranger?  
B. 
The rise and collapse of Global Crossing raised precisely this is-
sue.111 Global Crossing was formed in 1997 to close one of the last 
gaps in the Internet. The telecommunications cables connecting 
the continents were too small to accommodate the expected 
growth in Internet use outside of North America. In 1997, those 
outside North America accounted for only twenty percent Inter-
net use. By 2000, they were expected to account for almost half.112 
To take advantage of this change, Global Crossing laid a trans-
Atlantic cable within ten months and embarked on ambitious 
plans to create a global fiber network. It reached $1 billion in 
revenues within its first twenty months. Global Crossing contin-
ued to invest billions in creating the first network of fiber optic 
cable across the world’s oceans. Global Crossing’s fall, however, 
was as swift as its rise. Competitors appeared. Internet traffic 
grew, but not at the rate expected. Moreover, technological inno-
vation allowed much more information to be carried over the 
same cable. As a result, there was massive overcapacity in the in-
 
111 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick, 350 F.Supp.2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
112 For an account of Global Crossing’s rise, See GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM: 
THE WORLD AFTER BANDWIDTH ABUNDANCE 183-90 (2000). 
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dustry. Global Crossing’s revenue barely paid its ongoing ex-
penses, and its stock price collapsed.113 
When times were good, J.P. Morgan made large loans to 
Global Crossing and also established lines of credit that Global 
Crossing could draw down provided it met specified revenue 
goals. As Global Crossing’s financial condition deteriorated, its 
directors told J.P. Morgan that it had met its revenue goals and 
J.P. Morgan allowed it to draw down on the multi-billion dollar 
credit line.  
After Global Crossing collapsed, J.P. Morgan discovered that 
Global Crossing had met the revenue numbers needed to draw 
on the credit line through a loophole in the credit agreement. The 
agreement allowed Global Crossing to count as current revenue 
money it would receive from other carriers who leased fiber-optic 
cable to it. Global Crossing entered into many such leases with 
carriers who, at the same time, leased fiber-optic cable back from 
Global Crossing. The payment obligations each owed the other 
netted out to zero, but the credit agreement did not require that 
Global Crossing’s own payment obligations be offset against the 
payments it was receiving when it reported its revenue. As a re-
sult, Global Crossing could enter into leases of cable that neither it 
nor the other party would ever use and the only consequence 
would be the illusion of revenue that did not in fact exist. 
While Global Crossing disclosed that it entered into reciprocal 
trades, it did not disclose the extent to which the trades had been 
entered into solely for the purpose of creating the appearance of 
revenue. If J.P. Morgan knew just a little more about these recip-
rocal trades than it was told, it would not have allowed the draw 
on the credit line. Of course, if J.P. Morgan could show that the 
directors affirmatively lied to it and that it relied on these lies, it 
could prevail under an ordinary fraud action. But showing scien-
ter on the part of the directors was hard, and J.P. Morgan would 
have a much easier row to hoe if Global Crossing and its directors 
had an affirmative duty to disclose.  
 
113 Reinhardt Krause, More Worries Surface About Global Crossing After Can-
celed Merger INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, November 13, 2001, at A8. 
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If J.P. Morgan bought several billion in Global Crossing stock 
under similar circumstances instead of providing the same 
amount in the form of debt, it could sue the directors for failing to 
disclose the way the revenue numbers were generated. Just as the 
directors of a closely held firm who ask a shareholder for a cash 
infusion must disclose all of the relevant facts about its financial 
position or face personal liability for negligent misrepresentation, 
so too Global Crossing’s directors would face liability if it were 
seeking an equity contribution from J.P. Morgan.  
But given existing conceptions of fiduciary duty, there is no 
similar liability when directors seek an additional loan from an 
existing creditor. Because a corporation, by the conventional ac-
count, has no fiduciary relationship towards its creditors, the cor-
poration and its directors have no obligation to disclose material, 
nonpublic information to them.114 The District Court in Global 
Crossing rejected the argument that there were such disclosure 
obligations on just these grounds.115  
Of course, one could argue that a duty to creditors in fact ex-
isted. As we discussed in Part II, courts in Delaware have recog-
nized that a duty to creditors does exist when the corporation is in 
the “zone of insolvency.” One might argue that, given that Global 
Crossing was in the “zone of insolvency” at the time it drew on 
the credit line, it did in fact have a duty to disclose to J.P. Morgan. 
Even if J.P. Morgan has no right to bring a direct action against 
the directors for breach of duty, the duty may itself be sufficient 
to allow an action for failure to disclose. 
But it does not make sense to go down a path that makes any-
thing turn on fiduciary duties. One cannot sensibly allocate disclo-
sure duties by sorting through different types of investors. The 
characteristics that delineate investor topology—mostly cash flow 
and voting rights—are, at best, weakly correlated with investor 
labels. A high-yield junk bond (creditor) and ordinary equity 
(shareholder) are similar to each other, not only with respect to 
the cashflow rights, but also with respect to control rights. The 
 
114 Under Rule 10b-5, there is also the additional question of whether the 
bank loan counts as a “security.” 
115 See Winnick, 350 F.Supp.2d at 401. 
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covenants on the typical junk bond give creditors enormous con-
trol over the board and the corporation, including control over 
matters shareholders themselves do not have, such as the hiring 
and firing of the CEO.  
In addition, creditors often have close relationships that mimic 
those of shareholders who are owed fiduciary duties. As dis-
cussed above, firms generally owe strangers no duties (think of 
the farmers with oil under their land) while having to treat those 
close to them (think of ordinary shareholders) differently. But in-
creasingly creditors look more like the later than the former. Re-
turn to the example of J.P. Morgan and Global Crossing. In this 
case, J.P. Morgan was as far away from being a stranger (such as 
a farmer who sells mineral rights to a mining company) as one 
can imagine. It is closer to the firm than the typical shareholder 
who buys on an exchange. It had invested billions in the business, 
had done extensive due diligence, and was already entitled to all 
the information that the corporation possessed. It is odd to find 
that a director has no more duty to disclose information to such 
an investor than to a complete stranger.  
The question of what disclosure duties exist might more sensi-
bly turn not on notions of fiduciary duty, but on the relative abil-
ity of the parties to contract or expand the disclosure obligation 
that the law otherwise puts in place. It might seem that opting out 
of (or into) a disclosure requirement would be easy for a sophisti-
cated investor such as J.P. Morgan, and therefore that the law 
need not give it much. The law on this point, however, is not 
clear.  
On its face, disclosure obligations under the securities laws can-
not be waived at all.116 Nevertheless, an essential element of an 
action (either at common law or the securities laws) is reliance on 
the nondisclosure by the injured party. This has allowed a practice 
to emerge in specialized markets in which trading by those with 
material, nonpublic information is common and both parties want 
to opt out of any disclosure obligations the law imposes. They ex-
change what are called “Big Boy” letters. Each party asserts that it 
is a sophisticated investor (a “Big Boy”), recognizes that the other 
 
116 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a). 
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may possess material, nonpublic information, and affirms that it is 
not in any way relying on the other’s failure to disclose that in-
formation. Whether Big Boy letters work remains to be seen,117 
but they should, at least if the one signing the Big Boy letter is a 
sophisticated investor like J.P. Morgan.118 
If Big Boy letters work and if disclosure duties cannot be easily 
created by contract (a subject to which we return below), then it 
becomes easy to argue in favor of strong background disclosure 
obligations, at least with respect to any transactions in which the 
relationship between the parties is as well established as the one 
between J.P. Morgan and Global Crossing. In a world where an 
investor is owed no duties of disclosure, an investor’s ability to 
ensure that it receives the relevant information requires it to ask 
the right questions. This is by no means easy when the challenge 
is not gaining access to information, but rather in having access to 
so much that it is hard to sort and process. With respect to Global 
Crossing, J.P. Morgan had access to all the relevant information, 
but it lacked the ability to make sense of it. 
Under these circumstances, it may make sense to have a menu 
of different disclosure obligations embedded in the law that inves-
tors (and anyone else contracting with the corporation) could in-
voke in their original contracts.119 In other words, J.P. Morgan 
should have had the option to include a clause in its original loan 
agreement that, at least with respect to disclosure obligations, di-
 
117 Courts are split on whether these contracts are valid waivers of claims 
under the securities laws. Compare, Harsco Corp v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 341–48 
(2d Cir 1996) (upholding contract and dismissing claim); Jensen v. Kimble, 1 
F.3d 1073, 1074 (10th Cir 1993) (same), with AES Corp v Dow Chemical Co., 
325 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir 2003) (refusing to hold as a matter of law that nonre-
liance provisions are sufficient to immunize any Rule 10b-5 claims). 
118 See Daniel Sullivan, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, -- U. CHI. L. REV. --- 
(2008). 
119 This idea that the law can play a useful role in providing menus for par-
ties to draw upon was first developed by Dean Rasmussen. See Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 51 (1992). In recent years, others have expanded on this insight. See, 
e.g., Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Yair Listokin, What 
do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination (Yale 
Law School working paper, May 2005). 
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rectors have the same duties towards it that they would have vis 
à vis someone to whom the corporation owed a fiduciary duty 
(without at the same time generating the fiduciary duty itself). 
The law could provide other types of disclosure obligations, but 
the key is separating the disclosure obligation from the duty itself. 
Such a “menu” of disclosure choices allows parties to write 
what is, in effect, an “anti-Big Boy” letter. In a Big Boy letter, so-
phisticated investors opt for the menu choice of “none of the 
above.” In an “anti-Big Boy” letter, two sophisticated parties 
agree that, in circumstances where the law sees no duties, they 
will treat each other not like strangers, but like shareholders or 
others to whom disclosure obligations are owed. Of course, if it 
were as easy to write an anti-Big Boy letter that opts in to disclo-
sure obligations as to write the standard one that opts out of 
them, providing a menu would not be necessary and the disclo-
sure obligation the law provides as a baseline would be of little 
moment. But fashioning an anti-Big Boy letter may not be easy 
under current law.  
Personal liability of the directors is an essential ingredient of 
any disclosure obligation in this context. Without it, the investor’s 
only cause of action for the failure to disclose is against a party 
(the corporation) that already is liable on the underlying obliga-
tion. (J.P. Morgan already has a claim against Global Crossing for 
the amount of the loan. Being able to hold it liable for failure to 
disclose gives it nothing it does not already have.) But it is not at 
all clear that directors could be held personally liable in the event 
of a breach of an anti-Big Boy letter. Directors are not generally 
parties to a corporation’s contracts, and they may not be liable 
under current law for breach by the firm of an anti-Big Boy letter.  
One way around this difficulty would be to view the duties a 
firm adopts by contract as voluntary fiduciary duties. In the very 
few cases in which directors have been held personally liable or 
have personally paid settlements for corporate law failings, the 
allegations involved breaches of fiduciary duties.120 In this way, a 
breach of the terms of the anti-Big Boy letter, such as a failure to 
 
120 See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 
1068-70 (2006) (finding 12 cases of personally liability over the period 1991-
2004, all of which were for securities fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty).  
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disclose material, non-public information that a similarly situated 
shareholder would be entitled to receive, would amount to a 
breach of the board’s (and therefore individual directors’) fiduci-
ary duties.  
But, courts might be reluctant under current law to impose du-
ties that ordinarily arise only in a “special relationship” in circum-
stances where such a relationship does not exist. Other barriers to 
free contracting also exist. For instance, most firm charters con-
tain statutorily authorized exculpatory provisions that eliminate 
director liability for breaches of fiduciary duty that are not dis-
loyal.121 It may seem simple enough to opt out of exculpatory by-
laws, but this would require an expensive and uncertain share-
holder vote, and might not even work, as the further the parties 
get from agreements that look like fiduciary duties,122 the less 
likely courts will be to hold directors personally liable under a fi-
duciary duty-like doctrine.  
Under existing law, the directors could, of course, co-sign for 
the loans, not in the sense of shouldering a repayment obligation 
in the event of a default, but agreeing, by contract, to be person-
ally liable in the event of a failure to meet specified disclosure ob-
ligations. But executing a contract like this in a legal void would be 
extremely costly to implement. The directors would demand clar-
ity about what they were required to do and when they would be 
liable. A standardized menu of options can provide more clarity, 
at least over time. 
So where does this leave us? Linking disclosure solely to fiduci-
ary duties as is the case today makes little sense. A modest reform 
might be for the law to get out of the way of Big Boy letters and 
anti-Big Boy letters by rejecting the rigid linkage between the ob-
 
121 See D.G.C.L. § 102(b)(7). 
122 In general, trusts and fiduciary duties are not capable of modification by 
exculpatory provisions. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §1008 (“(a) A term of a trust 
relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable to the extent 
that it: (1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad 
faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of 
the beneficiaries; or (2) was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of 
a fiduciary or confidential relationship to the settlor.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §222(3) (1959) (same). 
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ligations of directors to, and only to, fiduciaries and disclosure ob-
ligations. In all events, however, the law should stand largely in 
support of the contracts the parties write, and, where possible, 
make it easier (through menus and other devices) for parties to 
set out their obligations to each other.  
V. 
In this paper, we have shown that the concept of director’s du-
ties in corporate law has been too narrowly conceived and too 
constrained by out-dated and over-simple notions of capital struc-
ture. But the problem is in fact much more pervasive than this. 
Conventional accounts of corporate law (whether in the law and 
economics literature or elsewhere) have, as a general matter, 
given far too much weight to the separateness of debt and equity, 
and have privileged equity and the rights of equityholders in cor-
porate law in a way that is now completely out of step with mod-
ern finance.123 
Board decisions should follow control rights, wherever and in 
whatever form they are manifest, and courts should largely get 
out of the way. This means courts should refuse to give creditors 
fiduciary duties (say in the zone of insolvency), refuse to allow 
shareholders to use fiduciary duties as a mechanism for upsetting 
director decisions that increase firm value or are conceivably part 
of the investors’ ex ante bargain, and refuse to perpetuate the in-
efficient link between disclosure and fiduciary duties. Directors 
 
123 For example, Lucian Bebchuk’s academic project is primarily about in-
creasing the power of shareholders vis-à-vis managers. Not only are “share-
holders” becoming increasingly hard to define, but Bebchuk, like most others, 
largely leaves other investors out of the equation. A recent book-length treat-
ment of the issue of shareholder activism is typical in its neglect of creditors. 
In The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism, James Hawley and Andrew Williams praise 
the stakeholder model of corporate governance, noting that “stakeholder 
claims directly challenge the finance model’s assertion that shareholders are 
the only . . . claimants on the firms residual profits and those with ultimate 
control authority.” JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FI-
DUCIARY CAPITALISM 85 (2002). The authors go on to define their claim for 
stakeholder power: “For example, in its broadest form, a stakeholder perspec-
tive takes what can be characterized as the ‘social debt’ of the corporation into 
perspective.” Id. The authors are not alone in largely ignoring creditors or 
“financial debt” and its role in the governance of firms.  
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should take from court decisions the simple maxim that they 
should do what is in the best interest of the firm, measured from 
the perspective of the ex ante bargain among investors. This will 
mean maximizing firm value in nearly every case, but, as in Oban, 
sometimes acting in ways that seem selfish but are really just effi-
cient and, viewed ex ante, value-maximizing. 
Written nearly a century ago, Louis Brandeis’s Other People’s 
Money criticized the way creditors exercised the power they had 
over firms. Brandeis showed that banks were significant investors 
in and exercised substantial control over the firms to whom they 
lent.124 Brandeis then went on to argue that banks ought to exer-
cise this control with an eye toward the interests of the middle-
class workers who provided the banks’ capital.125 Modern ac-
counts of corporate governance have forgotten about Brandeis 
and the centrality of the creditor in the corporate enterprise. Fol-
lowing Berle & Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty, they have focused instead on the diffusion of equity interests 
and the resulting separation of ownership and control.126 Our pa-
per is about resurrecting Brandeis’s positive account—that banks 
and other creditors are central to any coherent account of corpo-
rate governance—while leaving aside his populist normative 
claim for others to take up. Corporate law has focused too long 
on shareholders as the sole investors in the corporation, the sole 
recipients of director duties and energies, and the sole hope for 
constraining the managers of other people’s money. 
 
 
124 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY at 36 (describing the “end-
less chain” of transactions that bankers in control of firms used to benefit 
themselves). 
125 Id. at 134-36. 
126 See ADOLPH BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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